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RULES  OF  THUMB  FOR  EVALUATING  PREFERENTIAL  TRADING
ARRANGEMENTS:  EVIDENCE  FROM  CGE  ASSESSMENTS
GLENN W. HARRISON, THOMAS F. RUTHERFORD AND DAVID G . TARR*
Most interesting results on the welfare effects of regional arrangements
are ambiguous at a theoretical level.  Many questions only have quantitative
answers that are specific to the particular model and policy considered. Thus, to
determine the impact of prospective regional arrangements governments often
rely on a quantitative evaluation.  Usually at the request of a government involved,
we have implemented a number of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models
to inform policy-makers.1  We summarize the main conclusions we draw from
these studies, focusing on applications in the Americas.
These conclusions are drawn from a number of  model variants, including:
perfect and imperfect competition; comparative static, comparative steady-state
and dynamic; small open economy and multi-region; and representative consumer
and multi-household.  Despite the fact that we have found many of these results
mentioned below repeatedly in our numerical work, and frequently undertaken
piecemeal and systematic sensitivity analysis to identify the source of the results,
we characterize these conclusions as rules of thumb.2  We acknowledge that there
are modeling variants or parameter specifications where these rules of thumb may
not hold.
Rule 1:  Countries Excluded from a PTA Almost Always Lose
Beginning in the mid 1990’s, countries in Latin America have entered into a
“spaghetti bowl” of  Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs). Considering
each agreement on a pair-wise basis, excluded countries almost always lose from
such arrangements.  The obvious explanation is that the partner countries have
preferred access to the markets of the included countries, which reduces demand
for the exports of excluded countries into the markets of the PTA.
In Table 1 we collate some results to illustrate a number of points. These
calculations are based on the 1998 tariff of Chile of 11%.  With our central elasticities
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1 This includes work in Chile, Brazil, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Iran and Kyrgyzstan.
2 These are rules of thumb for welfare evaluation of these agreements, and thus are
different from the rules of thumb suggested by Schiff and Winters [2003, ch. 9]. The
latter are designed to maximize the benefits or minimize the costs of the agreements.
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we estimate that excluded countries as a whole lose US$169 million per year from a
Free Trade Agreement* (FTA) between Chile and MERCOSUR, but they lose US$384
per year from an agreement between Chile and NAFTA.3
TABLE 1
THE WELFARE IMPACT OF CHILE'S ADDITIVE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND GLOBAL FREE TRADE
a/ All products included in agreements and lumpsum tax replacement.
b/ Rest of SA is South America except for Chile, Argentina and Brazil.
c/ Sum of the welfare impact for countries included in the agreement.
d/ Sum of the welfare impact for countries excluded from the agreement.
Source:  Model estimates by authors.
3 Column 4 for Japan is an interesting exception. In this case, Chile adds an FTA with the
EU to its network of FTAs with MERCOSUR and NAFTA. This illustrates that it is
possible that an excluded country (here, Japan) can gain from a PTA from which it is
excluded if one or more of the partner countries (here,  the EU) is a significant
competitor with the excluded country in third country markets (here, the Rest of the
World). Since the EU diverts sales from third country markets to Chile, the excluded
country (Japan) would experience a terms of trade gain in the third country markets






















1. Chile central -291 414 590 2090 3350 504
(low) (-67) (149) (239) (1013) (1318) (270)
2. United States central -7 51 -29 138 60 19972
(low) (-24) (306) (231) (59) (-11) (10833)
3. Canada central 5 -20 -22 23 49 243
(low) (4) (-15) (-13) (14) (19) (-2058)
4. Mexico central 13 -58 -44 -11 15 -4539
(low) (1) (-35) (-35) (-3) (0) (-3315)
5.  Argentina central 63 -1 222 264 147 1832
(low) (44) (-18) (54) (54) (28) (1327)
6. Brazil central 214 -42 -171 -161 -70 3912
(low) (108) (-36) (15) (-11) (-21) (1004)
7. Central America central 4 -37 -32 -23 -38 6112
(low) (3) (-21) (-21) (-29) (-36) (2680)
8. Rest of So. America central -34 -56 -95 -73 -2024 7456
(low) (-28) (-39) (-75) (-90) (-376) (2110)
9. European Union central -184 -156 -336 -88 -200 207413
(low) (-28) (-241) (-317) (156) (86) (88720)
10. Japan  central   -58 -19 -30 81 -2 127664
(low) (-30) (-48) (-69) (-76) (-91) (73711)
11. Rest of the World central 92 -73 -50 -115 6 85111
(low) (29) (-89) (-100) (-229) (-232) (23348)
12. Sum for Included Countries c/ central -14 387 546 2255 1327
(low) (85) (405) (491) (1282) (1043)
13. Sum for Excluded  Countries d/ central -169 -384 -543 -130 -34
(low) (-73) (-492) (-582) (-424) (-359)
14. Sum over all countries central -183 3 3 2125 1293 455680
(low) (12) (-87) (-91) (858) (684) (198626)
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Rule 2:  Market Access is a Key Determinant of the Net Benefits of a PTA
From Table 1 we see that Chile’s agreement with MERCOSUR would induce
losses for Chile. On the other hand, the FTA between Chile and NAFTA benefits
Chile.  We have shown that Chile would lose even from a FTA with NAFTA without
preferred access in one or two key agricultural sectors in the United States. This
shows that if we only consider trade creation versus trade diversion effects in the
home market of Chile, both of these agreements are immizerising for Chile with our
central elasticity assumptions. Agreements with the large “Northern” markets
typically offer more market access, and from this factor alone agreements with
Northern partners are more likely to be beneficial than agreements with Southern
partners.
Rule 3:  With a FTA the External Tariff Can Be Lowered Such That a Poor FTA
Becomes Attractive
With its 11% uniform tariff as of 1998, we estimate that Chile would lose
from a FTA with MERCOSUR. But Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (2002) (HRT)
calculate that Chile will gain from a FTA with MERCOSUR with its present 6%
uniform external tariff. This suggests that, for countries that wish to liberalize
trade, one significant advantage of a FTA over a CU is that the FTA does not
prohibit the country interested in liberalizing its trade policies from doing so.  The
CU, on the hand, requires agreement on a common external tariff.
Moreover, the CU may impose a diverse tariff structure on a country that
has a less distortionary uniform tariff. HRT (2002) found that if Chile had accepted
the invitation to join the MERCOSUR CU, its losses would have exceeded the
losses we estimated from the FTA with an 11% tariff. Michalopoulos and Tarr
(1997) noted that Kyrgyzstan also had a uniform 10% tariff when it was invited to
participate in a CU with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. But the external tariff of
this CU had zero tariffs on most products produced by Kyrgyzstan and high tariffs
on products produced in Russia. Thus, the Kyrgyz would have borne most of the
trade diversion costs of the CU.
Rule 4:  For Southern Countries, North-South Agreements Offer a Beneficial
Increase in Competition in their Home Markets, and Involve Little
Increase in the Supply Price on Northern Country Sales in Southern
Countries.
We estimated the impact on developing countries of entering into a PTA
with a large Northern region in several cases (e.g., EU-Morocco, EU-Turkey, EU-
Tunisia, and Chile-NAFTA). We find that the Southern country would gain from
the agreement in all these cases.  Market access is important, as noted above. But
it is also important that the Northern countries are large in relation to the size of the
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Southern partner in these agreements; consequently Northern partners provide
additional supply to the Southern markets without raising their supply price. Even
Northern countries can benefit from increased competition from regional
arrangements with other Northern countries: HRT (1997a) find that the gains from
the single market in the European Union are more than doubled due to the increased
competition the single market will bring to European Union markets.
On the other hand, we estimated the impact of several South-South
arrangements on partner countries. The results here are much more mixed. Examples
of negative arrangements include Chile losing from an agreement with MERCOSUR;
Kyrgyzstan losing from a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazahkstan;
and Cameroon losing from the preferential trade aspects of its customs union
arrangement in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community. Bakoup
and Tarr (2000) show that the increase in the supply price due to  increased trade
with small partner countries is crucial to the conclusion that Cameroon will not
benefit from the preferential tariff reduction.
Rule 5:  Multilateral Trade Liberalization Results in Significantly Larger Gains
to the World than a Network of Regional Arrangements.
Largely because of the trade diversion effects on both included and
excluded countries, most regional arrangements we have studied result in small
gains or losses to the world as a whole. We find that multilateral trade liberalization
results in global gains many multiples of the gains from the typical regional
arrangement we have examined.  In only one case did we find substantial gains to
the world – we estimate that a FTA of the Americas plus a MERCOSUR-European
Union agreement will yield global gains of $46 billion p.a. in our central elasticity
case in HRT (2003).  But even this is still several multiples less than our estimated
gains to the world of free trade under the same set of elasticities.4
Rule 6: For Individual Countries Without High Protection, “Additive
Regionalism” will Likely Result in Substantially Larger Gains than
Unilateral Trade Liberalization.
a. Gains from preferential access.  Several countries, led by Chile, have
adopted a strategy of negotiating free trade agreements with all significant
trading partners. We called this strategy additive regionalism; the Office of
4 Based on the estimates of Reidel (1988), in our multi-region trade models we use
elasticities of substitution in import demand several times those employed in most
CGE models. As a consequence our models are not dominated by high terms of trade
effects (so countries will be expected to gain from unilateral trade liberalization except
for very low tariff levels), and trade diversion effects are larger. This significantly
contributes to our results for multilateral trade liberalization and for regional
arrangements. We argued in HRT (1997b) that the choice of elasticities is crucial to
explaining different results across competing models of the impact of the Uruguay
Round.
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the U.S. Trade Representative, in a fit of marketing brilliance, called it
“competitive liberalization.” In HRT (2002) we estimate that Chile’s strategy
of individually negotiating an FTA with each of its significant trading
partners results in gains to Chile many multiples of its gains from unilateral
trade liberalization. In part this is because Chile starts, in our analysis, with
a relatively undistorted most favored nation trade regime of an 11% uniform
tariff (now 6%). We estimate that unilateral trade liberalization will result in
gains to Chile of about 0.1 of a percentage point of its GDP. Moreover, in
the limit a network of FTAs eliminates trade diversion costs, since there can
be no trade diversion in the home market if there are agreements with all
partners.  In addition, FTAs bring preferred market access and terms of
trade gains that are not obtained with unilateral trade liberalization. Preferred
access to highly protected markets can yield very large gains if it can be
negotiated. The gains to Chile could be as high as 8% of GDP if it succeeded
in negotiating FTAs with all the regions in our Table 1 without product
restrictions. More dramatically, HRT [2002] estimate that Uruguay would
gain an enormous 44% of its GDP from a MERCOSUR-European Union
FTA that included free trade in the highly protected agricultural products
of the EU.
b. Exceptions and Antidumping.  On the other hand, if agriculture is excluded
from a MERCOSUR-EU FTA, instead of 44% Uruguay would obtain only
1% of its GDP. In practice, regions may exclude their most highly protected
sectors from regional agreements. For example, to date, the EU has provided
very little preferred market access in agriculture in its network of
Mediterranean agreements. This has been a great disappointment to its
partner countries, especially to Morocco, which proposed this kind of
arrangement with the hope of more agricultural access; and Chile and Brazil
are concerned that antidumping policies may significantly limit the potential
gains from a FTA of the Americas. So the large potential gains from preferred
access in regional arrangements may be illusory in practice.
Rule 7: Tax Replacement Requirements Reduce the Set of Desirable Regional
Arrangements.
Regional arrangements involve a loss of tariff revenue, since partner country
imports enter tariff free and trade diversion away from third countries involves an
additional loss of tariff revenue on third country imports. In order to replace revenue,
the government will have to employ alternate taxes. The use of alternate replacement
taxes, however, typically involves the creation of distortions that should be weighed
in the analysis as to whether to participate in a regional arrangement or not.  For
example, the value-added tax (VAT), which is one of the least distortionary
replacement taxes, will still impose distortions in practice. Even when the legal rate
of VAT is identical across sectors, the VAT will be collected at very different rates
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across sectors and will impose intersectoral distortions.  Agriculture and many
services sectors typically pay lower collected VAT rates due to tax evasion. In
Chile, for example, the legal value added tax rate is 18% across all sectors, but the
aggregate collected rate for the economy is about 9%, with the collected rate
varying across sectors from 2% to 18%. We calculate that the VAT in Chile involves
a “marginal cost of public funds” (MCF) of 7.6%. That is, consumers and producers
would have to be taxed 1076 pesos through the VAT for the government to receive
1000 pesos. The 76 pesos are the distortion costs of the VAT, and a welfare loss to
the Chilean economy.
It follows that regional arrangements that are only marginally beneficial
under the assumption of lump sum distortionless tax replacement may be welfare
reducing when the additional welfare cost of tax replacement is taken into
consideration.  In our GE framework, with a government budget constraint, the
economic link between domestic tax reform and foreign trade tax reform is
unavoidable.
Rule 8: Trade Taxes are Often an Inefficient Source of Tax Revenue
HRT (1997b) (2002) estimated the MCF from the Chilean tariff at 18.5%.
That is, consumers and producers would have to be taxed 1185 pesos through the
tariff for the government to receive 1000 pesos. Despite the fact that the Chilean
tariff is uniform across all sectors, and therefore does not impose inter-sectoral
distortions, it has a higher MCF than the VAT. The reason is that the tariff
discriminates geographically, favoring domestic import competing sectors ver-
sus imports (and implicitly taxing exports). By the standards of trade taxes, the low
Chilean uniform tariff imposes relatively few distortion costs. Nonetheless, even
this trade tax imposes more distortion costs than an inefficient VAT.
Rule 9: Trade Liberalization Should Be Expected To Be Pro-poor in Developing
Countries, but Results Will Be Diverse at the Household Level so Safety
Nets are Important
Although cross-country econometric work has found that open trade is
good for the poor (Dollar and Kraay (2001)), most of the early efforts by CGE
modelers to identify the links between trade policy and poverty were plagued by
data problems, such as those discussed by HRT (2003). In the case of Brazil,
however, HRT and Gurgel (2003) estimate that most of the trade policy options
under consideration result in a distribution of the gains to the different households
that is progressive, so that the poorest households experience the greatest
percentage increase in their incomes. In fact, they estimate that the poorest
households will gain about 3 to 4 times the average for the Brazilian economy. This
is because, although Brazil has dramatically liberalized its trade policy in the past
10 years, vestiges of its import substitution industrialization policies remain: capi-
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tal-intensive manufacturing sectors remain the most highly protected sectors of
the economy. Thus, trade policy changes in Brazil tend to shift resources from
capital-intensive manufacturing toward unskilled labor-intensive agriculture and
less capital-intensive manufacturing, thereby inducing an increase in the wage of
unskilled labor relative to other factors of production.
Many analysts have found that it is factor income changes, and not
expenditure patterns, that are crucial to determining the outcome on the poor from
trade policy changes. Among factor income changes, the wage of unskilled labor
is the most important determinant of the impact of trade policy changes on the
poor. So an increase in the relative wage of unskilled labor should result in an
increase in the incomes of the poorest households.
In developing countries we might expect that the labor intensive sectors
that are important to the poor will be disfavored by the structure of protection, so
that the medium to long run effects of these trade reforms would be positive for the
poorest households. In practice, there will be cases where the poor may not gain
more than proportionately relative to the average for the economy. But growth
from open trade regimes should be expected to lift the majority of the poor
households. We emphasize, however, that at a very dis-aggregated level some
poor households (like maize farmers in Mexico) could lose, especially in the short
run. This emphasizes the need for effective safety net policies to be in place.5
Rule 10:We Do Not Expect Dynamic Effects to Reverse Conclusions Regarding
Regionalism
Rutherford and Tarr (forthcoming) developed a fully dynamic small open
economy model of Chile with constant returns to scale in all sectors. They show
that simply adding dynamics to a perfectly competitive constant returns to scale
model will not change the welfare results in any significant way. The reason is that
trade liberalization that induces a larger capital stock does not necessarily improve
welfare since the capital stock is already optimized on the steady state path based
on the consumption-investment tradeoff.  Thus, it is not the case that “any kind of
dynamics” is sufficient to produce larger gains from trade liberalization, or produ-
ce larger gains from a regional arrangement. In particular, the losses from the
Chile-MERCOSUR agreement are not eliminated, and are in fact slightly larger.
Rutherford and Tarr  (2002) show that when learning and technology effects
are taken into account endogenously in a fully dynamic model with increasing
returns to scale, the estimated gains from trade liberalization will be many multiples
of the estimated gains from a static model. It does not follow, however, that the
estimated gains from PTAs would be much larger when learning and technology
5 Jensen and Tarr (forthcoming) have shown that incomes of the poor in Iran would
double or triple if commodity subsidies were converted to non-targeted direct income
support. Of course, targeted income support for the poor would be even more beneficial
for them.
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transfer effects are incorporated, even if the static effects are dominated by trade
diversion. In ongoing work, we find that there is a dynamic form of trade diversion
in models that allow for productivity impacts and technology transfer from imports.
That is, while regional preferences will encourage additional varieties and
technology imports from regional partners, it will discourage additional varieties
and technology imports from the rest of the world. As pointed out by Coe et al.
(1997), one should question how technologically advanced and large the
prospective partner really is. For prospective partners such as the European Union
or NAFTA, the additional technology imports are likely to be sufficiently large to
offset the losses from the rest of the world.6  In this case the dynamic model will
produce gains from regional arrangements with technologically advanced partners
that are several times the estimated gains from static models. On the other hand, if
a PTA is made with a technologically less advanced region, the diversion of new
technologies or varieties from the rest of the world could hinder productivity
advances in the home country. On balance, growth and welfare may be reduced
and may result in losses several multiples of the estimated static losses.
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